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Minority rights have seen substantial advances over the past decade. A marginal topic 
during the Cold War, they have since entered mainstream debates and instruments of 
human rights. The establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the 
OSCE, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the CoE 
and the Copenhagen Criteria for the admission of new members to the EU, have each 
provided for substantial advances in the promotion of minority rights. 
 
Minority rights, nevertheless, remain largely undefined and international standards are 
vague and evasive, not the least of which is the definition of ‘minorities’ themselves. 1 
Although ‘the highest European standards’ remain often invoked by both minority 
leaders and governments in Southeastern Europe, the term is largely devoid of meaning. 
In addition to protecting minorities from discrimination, minority rights have focused on 
two key areas: linguistic rights and educational rights.  
 
These two areas have been supplemented by the concept of political participation as a part of 
minority rights. Including political participation in the larger concept of minority rights can 
be based on two arguments: First, that other rights and prevention of discrimination of 
minorities cannot be effectively ensured, unless the minority itself is actively partaking in the 
political decision-making processes which govern the protection of minority rights. Thus, 
without participation other mechanisms of minority rights protection can be substantially 
weakened. Second, minorities run the risk of being excluded from the political system 
without special protective measures. Particularly in countries with mobilized ethnic 
nationalism, majorities (and minorities) have been unlikely to vote for parties or candidates 
of other nations or ethnic groups. The odds of political representatives from minority 
communities successfully partaking in the political system are thus limited. Furthermore, a 
number of approaches to democracy run the risk of permanently excluding minorities. Most 
obviously, the British-style ‘First-Past-The-Post’ electoral syste m has the feature of 
excluding dispersed minorities from representation.2 Additionally, electoral districts can be 
drawn to favour the dominant nation. A number of other tools intentionally or inadvertently 
can preclude or minimize the minorities’ share of  representation in political institutions. 
Thus, a number of scholars of divided societies and ethnic relations have concluded that the 
                                                
1
 See Tim Potier, “Re gionally Non-dominant Titular Peoples: The Next Phase in Minority Rights?”,, 
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (July 2001): 
http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/JEMIE06Potier11-07-01.pdf , pp. 2-3. 
2
 It favours, however, territorially concentrates groups, such as voters in favour of Scottish independence in 
the House of Commons. 
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conventional institutions of democracies without minorities are insufficient to allow for a 
stable democratic system in diverse societies.3 
 
In addition to the ‘injustice of procedural democracy’ 4, stability provides a key argument 
for specific measures to include minorities. Alienation of minorities from their state of 
residence and responses ranging from extraparliamentary organizations to armed 
secessionist movements have been key challenges to states in recent decades. It is thus in 
the interest of state stability to provide for political inclusion of minorities, in order to 
avoid the consequences of exclusion. While most would agree on the need to devise 
special institutions in divided societies, little consensus exists on what type of institutions 
to pursue alternatively. The controversies derive from two conceptual differences. Some 
approaches concentrate on representation, while others focus on cooperation.5  
In debates about minority rights, the emphasis has been put on representation, as 
exemplified by the first article of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective 
Participation of Minorities in Public Life:  
Effective participation of national minorities in public life is an essential 
component of a peaceful and democratic society. Experience in Europe and 
elsewhere has shown that, in order to promote such participation, 
governments often need to establish specific arrangements (emphasis added) 
for national minorities. These Recommendations aim to facilitate the 
inclusion of minorities within the State and enable minorities to maintain 
their own identity and characteristics, thereby promoting the good governance 
and integrity of the State.6 
 
The Lund Recommendations of 1999, drafted by international experts for the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, is the first comprehensive list of mechanisms for 
achieving minority inclusion in public institutions.7 While referring to international 
Human Rights protection mechanisms, the Lund Recommendations move well beyond 
international legal standards and instead draw from the rich experience of ensuring 
minority representation extant in numerous European countries. This contribution argues 
that political participation constitutes and important aspect of minority rights protection.  
                                                
3
 Donald L. Horowitz,”The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict. Democracy in Divided Societies ,” 4(4) Journal of 
Democracy (1993), pp. 18-37; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 
(New Haven, London, 1977), 25-52. 
4
 Expression borrowed from Thomas W. Simon, “The Injustice of Procedural Democracy,” in D•emal 
Sokolovi• and Florian Bieber (eds.), Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Aldershot, 2001), 11-28.  
5
 This divide is usually associated with the two authors Ljiphart and Horowitz. For a short overview of the 
two alternative approaches see Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic 
Conflicts (Washington, 1996), 34-45. 
6
 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation 
of National Minorities in Public Life, September 1999, Art. 1/1. 
7
 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities contains only a vague commitment 
in Art. 15 to ensure the minorities participation in public life. 
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Instead of being understood as right in and of itself, political participation should be 
conceived of as an instrument of minority rights protection. Recent experience in the 
former Yugoslavia, as will be reviewed here in broad strokes, suggests that minority 
rights without minority participation in the institutional framework of minorities’ rights 
protection and other public institutions has been largely ineffective. At the same time, 
political participation of minorities alone, without a comprehensive framework of 
minority rights protection, as again will be explored here on the basis of examples in the 
former Yugoslavia, are equally inadequate for securing the rights of minorities. In fact, 
there has been a danger that in the former Yugoslavia political representation has 
received excessive importance over substantive minority rights. 
 
The argument that minorities’ rights cannot be protected withou t participation of 
minorities in public life and in the mechanisms of protection is a pretty straightforward 
one.  First, the protective mechanisms run the risk of not being relevant for the minority 
community; that is, they might focus on the protection of educational rights, whereas 
social rights might be of more fundamental importance. This has been a common 
challenge with the adequate protection of Roma communities across Eastern Europe. 
Second, enforcement has been a critical difficulty with minority rights protection in the 
region.8 Laws have often been largely exemplary, enacted only to satisfy international 
demands and to meet criteria for accession to international organizations. States have 
been, however, reluctant to implement these laws. This has been particularly the case in 
Tudjman’s Cro atia and in the former Yugoslavia during the Miloševiæ era. T he reality for 
minorities was substantially worse than outlined in minority rights instruments, which 
existed pro forma.9 Admittedly, neither of the two were democracies during the 1990s; 
thus the lack of implementation of legal and democratic standards were not limited to 
minorities. At the same time, similar difficulties, albeit less pronounced, can be found in 
the democracies of the region.10 Enforcement through representation in state institutions 
and some autonomous minority institutions, such as found in Hungary, are thus crucial 
for the protection of minority rights. 
 
The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia exemplify, however, that political 
representation alone cannot suffice in protecting the interests of the different ethnic 
groups and in stabilizing the two countries. Nondominant groups11 enjoyed broad 
                                                
8
 Already the Minority Treaties, concluded with some countries after World War I, largely failed to 
improve the life of minorities due to the absence of enforcement and implementation. 
9
 Tibor Varady, “Minorities, Majorities, Law, and Ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav Case”, 19 (1) 
Human Rights Quarterly (1997), 9-54. 
10
 EU Accession Monitoring Program, Monitoring Minority Protection in the EU Accession Process 
(Budapest, 2002). 
11
 In Bosnia, the term ‘minorities’ is reserved for  communities other than the three ‘constituent peoples’ 
(Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats). Thus, here the term ‘nondominant groups’ refers to any of the three constituent 
people where they are not in a dominant position. Serbs in the Federation, Bosniaks and Croats in the Serb 
Republic would qualify. Furthermore Croats in Sarajevo or Bosniaks in Western Herzegovina would 
equally qualify. Key is the relationship to the respective layer of governance. Due to the dispersion of 
power among multiple layers, one individual can be nondominant in his/her interaction with one layer, but 
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political representation in parliament and in government. Both in Macedonia since the 
early 1990s and in Bosnia since the end of the war, coalition governments existed that 
incorporated representatives of the different groups. While Macedonia did not possess 
specific tools for ensuring representation of Albanians in parliament or government, 
Albanian parties were at no point excluded from the political process. In Bosnia, 
equitable representation in parliament and government is constitutionally regulated at the 
state level and in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Only in the Serb Republic the two 
nondominant groups, Croats and Bosniaks, were not represented in government before 
the constitutional changes of 2002, but did sit in the entity’s parliament. 12 This degree of 
representation did not, however, provide sufficient safeguards for the protection of the 
two nondominant groups. In Macedonia, the absence of adequate representation of 
Albanians in state administration, especially in the police force and the limited ability to 
use Albanian in public administration, as well as other minority–rights-related issues 
furthered broad support among the Albanian population for the armed conflict during the 
spring and summer of 2001. In Bosnia, nondominant groups fail to enjoy adequate rights 
in terms of employment and schooling, furthermore frequently facing discrimination 
through local administrations. This has been a key factor in delaying the so-called 
‘minority returns’ –refugees or internally displaced persons returning to their prewar 
residence in areas where they now constitute a nondominant group. 
 
In both cases, the argument could be made that the inadequacies of minority protection 
derive from insufficient political representation. There is little doubt that there has been 
inadequate political representation of nondominant groups in both cases. Albanian parties 
tended to take less seats in the Macedonian parliament than their percentage of the overall 
population would suggest; Croat and Bosniak parties were not included in the 
government or the administration of the Serb Republic before 2002.13 Nevertheless, a 
number of reasons suggest that enhanced political representation is not the solution to 
facilitating the protection of the rights of nondominant groups. 
 
First, political representation is largely unconcerned with cooperation between the 
different communities’ representatives in the different po litical institutions and also less 
inclined to decree a share in the decision-making process. The reason for this is obvious: 
While it is easy to find legal instruments to ensure representation, neither cooperation nor 
codecision-making is easily legislated. In a number of cases, representation, even at the 
governmental level, does not translate into participation in the decision-making process. 
                                                                                                                                            
not with another. In Macedonia, the term minority is more clear-cut, but no less contentious. Thus, the use 
of ‘nondominant people’ primarily refers to the Albanian community, which has aspir ations beyond the 
mere safeguard of minority rights. 
12
 On the different institutional mechanisms see Florian Bieber, “Power -sharing after Yugoslavia. 
Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power-Sharing Institutions in Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia and 
Kosovo,” Paper presented at the conference “ From Power-sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions 
in Ethnically Divided Societies,” 8 -10.11.2002, London, Canada. 
13
 In 2001 for the first time a Bosniak became minister in the Serb Republic. 
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In fact, representation can lead to pluralistic window-dressing with the dominant nation 
controlling the political process.  
 
Second, in a system without firm legal safeguards for minority rights, political 
representation has to permanently negotiate these rights. ‘Negotiating’ rights implies that 
certain minimum standards of protection are not guaranteed, but have to be continuously 
fought for or sought by the representatives of the respective community. Additionally, the 
representatives of the group might excessively broaden the agenda of issues that are part 
of the rights or protective measures required for the group, leading to an ‘ethnification’ of 
broad areas of the political process which extend well beyond the narrow community 
interests. As ‘ethnic issues’ have an additionally mobilizing function with the electorate 
and might have additional institutional safeguards (veto rights), parties have an interest in 
extending the sphere of ‘ethnic issues’.  
 
Third, protecting the communities through political representation is likely to benefit 
larger communities with adequate representation while disadvantaging smaller groups 
who, either due their size or their lesser political mobilization, are less able to pursue 
their demands. Thus, minorities beyond the three constituent nations in Bosnia and 
minorities other than Albanians in Macedonia have been largely excluded from 
negotiations of the protection of the rights of the different communities. 
 
Fourth, representation from the nondominant group does not equal complete 
representation of the whole group. Just as within majorities, minority communities often 
support largely different political options. ‘Rights’ for the Croat minority in the Serb 
Republic will be perceived to be largely different whether the deputy is a Croat from the 
multiethnic Social Democratic Party or the nationalist Croat Democratic Community. As 
minority representation inherently will be less numerous than that of the majority, whole 
diversity of the nondominant community will not necessarily be represented. It could be 
argued that minority rights protection can also protect the community from some its own 
political leaders.  
 
To conclude, just as general instruments for the protection of human rights and the rule of 
law are also deemed necessary in functioning democracies, minority rights cannot be 
short-circuited by political representation. Few would argue that a system of government 
could work with human rights protection and the rule of law, but without political 
representation of the citizens of the country; that is, without democracy. Similarly, 
minorities can only be included in their state through representation and the safeguard of 
both the rights of the group and the members of the group. Political representation 
without protection of minority rights is thus likely to result in instability and arbitrariness, 
like a state governed by elections, but without the legal safeguards preventing abuse by 
those elected. 
 
 
 
